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I. Introduction 
 
In this paper I compare the habeas corpus systems of El Salvador, the United States and 
Argentina.  My purpose is to develop a general understanding of the procedure for bringing the 
writ in each country and analyze the substantive law governing the rights of habeas corpus 
petitioners in each country.  I evaluate the systems against the backdrop of each country’s 
political and legal history with respect to the writ of habeas corpus.  The ultimate aim of this 
paper is to reform the habeas corpus law of El Salvador by analyzing the Salvadoran system as 
compared to the Argentine and U.S. systems.   
I conclude that the Argentine habeas corpus system provides a better model for the 
Salvadoran system than does the U.S. system.  I draw this conclusion because the two countries 
share common foundations for their legal systems, in addition to common histories of civil war, 
during which there were numerous disappearances and denial of habeas corpus rights.  
Moreover, Argentina’s habeas corpus law protects the liberty interest of the detained individual 
more so than U.S. habeas corpus law.  This heightened protection of the right to liberty largely 
results from the country’s past history of forced disappearances and incommunicado detention.  
Because El Salvador witnessed similar problems in its past, the Argentine model provides a good 
model for Salvadoran reform.  The details of my analysis and more specific recommendations 
are discussed in parts III and IV below. 
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II. Research results 
A. Latin American systems of amparo  
Many Latin American systems have modeled their habeas corpus laws after the English 
common law writ, including El Salvador and Argentina.  The writ, meaning literally “you have 
the body,” was used to ensure that a detained person would always be brought before a judge to 
determine the legality of the detention.1  However, the adoption of the writ that protected the 
individual by allowing a court to declare the person’s detention unlawful necessarily granted 
broad powers to the judiciary.  Latin America’s civil law tradition did not easily incorporate such 
expanded powers for the judiciary.2  Therefore, many Latin American systems created a hybrid 
for the civil law restriction on the judiciary and the individual protections guaranteed in a 
constitutional democracy such as England.  The hybrid became the writ of amparo or 
“protection.”  The writ of amparo was first instituted in Mexico in 1847.3  
The writ of amparo is a federal proceeding which may be brought by any person who 
complains that his constitutional rights are being violated by a public official.  If the petitioner is 
successful, the judge will grant only protection to that individual; the judge will not have the 
power to declare the law unconstitutional.4  Habeas corpus emerged in Latin America as a 
subset of amparo.  Habeas corpus law applies only when a person is in custody, whereas amparo 
applies in other situations where a person is wronged by the act of a public official.5     
B. Salvadoran habeas corpus law 
1. Background 
 
Habeas corpus first appeared in the Salvadoran constitution in 1841, although its 
inclusion was suggested by legislators as early as 1810.  The model for Salvadoran habeas 
corpus law was the English system, which was founded upon the dignity of the person and the 
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requirement that a detained person always have access to a court of law.6  Each subsequent 
constitution and the present constitution of 1983 have expressed an individual’s right to the writ 
of habeas corpus.7   
During the civil war in El Salvador during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, there were 
frequent abuses of the writ of habeas corpus.  Prisoners were denied the writ based on 
procedural technicalities, detaining authorities transferred prisoners without notice to the judge 
charged with hearing the case, or authorities simply denied that the person was in their 
possession.8  Those who needed habeas corpus protection the most, persons detained by the 
military, were denied their basic habeas corpus rights; thus the writ was only effective in cases 
of common crimes.9  There were several attempts to ameliorate the political and legal systems in 
El Salvador following the civil war.  The UN Observer mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was 
set up by the 1990 San Jose agreement to monitor the peace process after the war.10  In addition, 
the United States sponsored a judicial reform project in response to the unpunished killing of 
American churchwomen there.  This project focused mainly on establishing a more independent 
and well-financed judiciary in El Salvador to reverse the reign of impunity.11  Although there 
were suggestions on improving the habeas corpus legal system, no noticeable reforms have 
resulted from these suggestions.12     
2. Salvadoran habeas corpus: the process 
Salvadoran habeas corpus law applies to all individuals who are in “custody,” which 
means that a person is detained within certain limits or that his movements are confined to 
certain territorial limits or dictated by another.13  Cognizable claims under the law include 
unlawful detention by public authorities and violations of constitutional norms; 14 petitioners 
may also claim derogation of physical, psychological or moral integrity.15  
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Once a person is in “custody” for the purposes of habeas corpus law, he must present the 
writ of habeas corpus in writing to the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme 
Court of Justice or Courts of Appeals outside the capitol.16  This restriction on courts that may 
hear habeas corpus petitions has led to suggestions by ONUSAL that the habeas process should 
be more decentralized and therefore more accessible to the common person.17  No oral writs are 
allowed; this provision has also given rise to criticism that the habeas corpus procedure is 
inaccessible to many petitioners.18  Additionally, the petition must be written with sufficient 
detail.  Although the Law of Constitutional Procedures allows the court to substitute for errors,19 
recent court decisions have denied writs of habeas corpus for failure to follow the formalities.20 
Furthermore, there is no requirement for exhaustion of remedies and a person in custody may 
bring any number of habeas corpus petitions.  A habeas corpus petition thus interrupts the 
proceedings in the underlying case because the habeas corpus issue must be resolved before the 
case can continue against any of the defendants.21   
Upon receipt of a petition for habeas corpus, the court assigns the case to a judge 
executor, who locates the petitioner, investigates the legality of the detention and submits a 
report to the court.22  The judge executor is commonly a law student, and receives no additional 
training for the job of judge executor.23  The crucial role played by this non-judge, non-lawyer in 
the habeas corpus process has also raised concerns of whether such a person should be given so 
much responsibility in protecting the fundamental right to liberty.24  The institution of judge 
executor has also been criticized for delaying the resolution on any habeas corpus petition, since 
the habeas corpus report must pass through this additional person before the court reviews it.25  
Furthermore, this institution is merely a relic of the past and thus inconsistent with El Salvador’s 
change from an inquisitive system to a more adversarial system.26
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When the judge executor investigates the case, the detaining authority must present the 
individual immediately and give reason for the detention.27  The individual never receives the 
right to a hearing, since habeas corpus is a legal, not evidentiary issue.28  If denied, the 
individual has the right to an appeal within five working days.29  The right to judicial review by 
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Court is guaranteed under the 
Constitution.30
The writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended in the state of emergency.  El 
Salvador’s law is thus consistent with inter-American human rights law.31  However, Salvadoran 
law permits a standard period of inquiry of seventy-two hours, during which time the judge 
executor may not see the petitioner.32  This period may be extended up to fifteen days in the case 
of war, invasion, rebellion, sedition, catastrophe, or serious disturbances of the public order.33  
The permissible period of inquiry effectively serves to negate the protection of there being no 
suspension of the writ in states of emergency.  Rather, permitting the detaining authority to hold 
the detainee for even seventy-two hours without presenting him to the judge executor allows 
abuses of incommunicado detention, which the writ of habeas corpus is designed to prevent 
from occurring. 
C. Argentine habeas corpus    
1. Background 
Argentina ushered in its first habeas corpus legislation in 1863, with a law that was based 
on the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789.34  The first law to constitutionalize habeas corpus was the 
Habeas corpus law of 1984, which removed federal habeas corpus from the criminal procedure 
code and established it as a special law.35  The constitutional reforms of 1994 then gave express 
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constitutional recognition to habeas corpus by explicitly stating that habeas corpus was a 
constitutional procedure.36   
Argentina, like El Salvador, had a period of history where the right to habeas corpus was 
frequently reduced to a nullity.  During the military dictatorship of 1976-1984, thousands of 
people were disappeared.  When their families filed writs of habeas corpus on their behalf, most 
cases were dismissed after the military denied ever having seen the person.  This history resulted 
more from the executive’s refusal to respect the law and less from failure of the legal institutions 
as written.37  However, the Argentine legislature still deemed it necessary to respond to this 
history of disappearances in the 1994 constitutional reforms.  Article 43 of the Constitution now 
expressly applies habeas corpus to situations of forced disappearances.  In addition, the 
constitutionalization of habeas corpus law promoted a heightened protection of the writ so that 
episodes of its past would never again occur. 38   
2. Argentine habeas corpus: the process 
Argentina, like El Salvador, uses a broad definition of “custody” to determine when a 
person may apply for the writ of habeas corpus.  Under the Habeas corpus law, a person is in 
custody when there is a present threat to ambulatory liberty or if there is an illegitimate 
worsening of legitimate detention.39  Also like the Salvadoran system, cognizable claims under 
habeas corpus law include unlawful detention by public authorities and violations of general 
constitutional norms.40  Argentina however, has gone further than El Salvador in responding to 
its historical abuse of the writ; the 1994 amendments to the Constitution include forced 
disappearances as a cognizable claim under habeas corpus law.41  Additionally, Argentine 
habeas corpus law has recognized deprivations of liberty including forced military service and 
the expulsion of foreigners from the country.42
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The writ of habeas corpus may be presented orally or in writing to a the clerk of judges 
of the first instance in the criminal division if in the federal capital, or to section judges if the 
individual is in the national territory of the provinces.43  The Argentine system thus is more 
accessible to its petitioners than the Salvadoran system, since literacy or geography do not limit 
one’s ability to present the writ.  Like the Salvadoran system, there is no limitation on the 
number of writs filed and there is no requirement that the petitioner exhaust his remedies.   
Once the writ is filed, the judge investigates and makes all necessary reports for the 
petitioner’s case.44  Thus the Argentine system places the protection of this fundamental right to 
liberty in the hands of a judge, unlike the Salvadoran system.  The judge immediately orders the 
detaining authority to present the petitioner before the court, or explain any transfer of custody 
that has been made.45  Only if the individual can not be brought before the court does the judge 
visit the place where the person is detained.  In this case, the judge may also authorize a family 
member or a trustee of the court to observe the situation of the detained individual, as does the 
judge executor in the Salvadoran system.46  The Argentine system is also more protective of the 
fundamental right to liberty because the habeas corpus petitioner has a right to a hearing.  With 
this hearing comes the right to legal representation, to testify, present evidence and receive an 
immediate final decision.47  As in the Salvadoran system, the Argentine system guarantees the 
right to an appeal, although the petitioner needs to wait only twenty-four hours for an appeal, 
unlike the five day period in Salvadoran law.48                
Argentina is equally as observant of inter-American jurisprudence regarding the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in states of emergency.  The writ may not be suspended 
during states of siege in Argentina.49  During states of siege, the judge will still hear the 
petitioner’s writ and will determine the legitimacy of the state of siege, the correlation between 
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the deprivation of liberty and the situation that gave rise to the siege, and any illegitimate 
aggravation of conditions of detention.50
D. U.S. Habeas corpus 
1. Background 
U.S. habeas corpus law traces its roots back to English common law, which ensured that 
no free man would be imprisoned without due process of law.51  The Federalist Papers adopted 
English habeas corpus law to protect against arbitrary punishment and arbitrary imprisonment.52  
The right of habeas corpus was adopted in both the Constitution of 178953 and the 1789 
Judiciary Act.54  The Federal Habeas corpus Act, adopted in 1867 and amended on several 
different occasions, today governs the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts.55   
The U.S. habeas corpus writ has not seen nearly as troubling of a past as the writs of El 
Salvador and Argentina.  Nonetheless, the U.S. habeas corpus system is the only one of the three 
that officially allows for the writ to be suspended in states of emergency.  The Suspension Clause 
of the Constitution allows for its suspension in cases of rebellion or invasion or when the public 
safety shall require it.56  Indeed, the writ was suspended during the U.S. civil war; President 
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in 1861 and 1862.57  Thus the U.S. writ does not 
follow the inter-American jurisprudence of its Latin American counterparts.  However, the U.S. 
also does not have the same obligation to follow advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, since the U.S. does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court.58
2. U.S. habeas corpus: the process 
Like El Salvador and Argentina, the U.S. system has a broad definition of custody for the 
purposes of bringing the writ of habeas corpus.  A petitioner must be in custody under or by 
color of authority of the United States; his custody can mean that he is subject to any restraints 
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not shared by the public generally.59  Cognizable claims under habeas corpus law are any 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the U.S.60   
The writ of habeas corpus is presented in writing to the Supreme Court, district courts or 
any circuit court judge.61  Unlike the Salvadoran and Argentine systems, U.S. federal habeas 
corpus law requires the exhaustion of state remedies before a petitioner can bring a federal 
habeas corpus petition62 and each petitioner may only bring one habeas corpus petition on an 
issue.63  The provisions for exhaustion of remedies and against successive habeas corpus 
petitions may provide an example for El Salvador, whose Supreme Court can more easily 
become overloaded with habeas corpus petitions.64
Once a habeas corpus petition has been filed with the court, the judge issues all necessary 
reports for the case.  The judge orders the detaining authority to show cause for the detention and 
holds a hearing.65  The requirement for presentation of the individual occurs at the hearing; 
however, there need not be a hearing if the petition presents solely a matter of law.66  Thus the 
U.S. system provides less protection against arbitrary detention than the Argentine system, since 
there is no guaranteed hearing or presentation of the individual to a judge under U.S. habeas 
corpus law.  The presentation of the individual is the sine qua non of habeas corpus law, yet the 
U.S. system does not grant even that basic protection to all habeas corpus petitioners.   
When a hearing takes place, the rights of the petitioner are similar to those in the 
Argentine system; U.S. petitioners have a right to legal representation, to testify, present 
evidence and receive documents at no cost if indigent.67  Unlike the Argentine and Salvadoran 
systems, the U.S. habeas corpus petitioner has no right to an appeal unless the judge issues a 
certificate of appealability, which may only be issued if the petitioner has made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.68  Again, the U.S. system’s focus on efficiency 
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and reducing case load operates to deny rights under habeas corpus law that other countries have 
found to be important to the protection of the right to individual liberty. 
 
III. Conclusion 
Based on my study of the three systems, I make the following recommendations for 
change to the Salvadoran habeas corpus process.  First, the petitioner should be brought before a 
judge and the institution of judge executor should be abolished.  Although the judge executor 
may play a role in assisting the court with administrative matters and legal research, the judge 
executor should function more as a clerk and less as a judge in determining the fundamental right 
to freedom from arbitrary detention.  Abolishing the institution of the judge executor would 
allow the petitioner to be presented more quickly to a judge and would speed up the process for 
the petitioner and all other parties. 
Second, the habeas corpus process should become more accessible to its petitioners.  The 
system should allow for the presentation of oral writs so that literacy is not an impediment to the 
full realization of rights under habeas corpus law.  In addition, courts of first instance (trial 
courts) should be given jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions.  This change will not only 
make the system more accessible to persons throughout the country, but it will also decrease the 
case loads of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts that currently hear all habeas corpus 
petitions. 
Third, habeas corpus petitioners should be entitled to the right to a hearing.  The rhetoric 
in the constitution about the importance of the writ of habeas corpus as a fundamental right is 
inconsistent with the fact that a petitioner may never be heard by the court about this 
fundamental right.  Moreover, the additional administrative burden of mandating habeas corpus 
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hearings would be offset by adopting the above recommendation to grant habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to courts of first instance. 
Fourth, habeas corpus law should require the exhaustion of remedies before presenting a 
petition.  Such a change would confer upon the underlying process a sense of legitimacy, since 
habeas corpus petitioners would use these provided mechanisms for resolving their cases.  Any 
need for improvement in the underlying judicial process should be addressed separately.  Such a 
change would also speed up the process in the underlying case.  Moreover, a requirement for 
exhaustion of remedies will further decrease the case load of the courts that presently hear 
habeas corpus petitions and thus preserve the process for petitioners who have completed the 
underlying process and challenge an aspect of that process. 
Finally, there should be no period of inquiry during which time the judge executor is 
prevented from seeing the petitioner.  The allowance of up to fifteen days for this period during a 
state of emergency is too long.  However, even the usual allowance of up to seventy-two hours 
for this period is too long.  The basic protections of habeas corpus law are seriously undermined 
by this period of inquiry.  The right to have a court judge the legality of the detention and the 
presentation of the individual mean little when during the crucial period of detention, namely the 
first couple days, the petitioner may be held incommunicado.   
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